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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MODERNIZING STATE VOTING LAWS THAT DISENFRANCHISE
THE MENTALLY DISABLED WITH THE AID OF PAST SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a
1
way that unnecessarily abridges this right.
If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all
things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in
our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your
answer. . . . It’s the answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat
and Republican, black, white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight,
disabled and not disabled—Americans who sent a message to the world that
we have never been just a collection of individuals or a collection of Red
States and Blue States; we are and always will be the United States of
2
America.

Justice Black’s and President Barack Obama’s words cited above implicate
the power of voting in America’s democracy. Their words highlight the dual
nature of voting as an independent, personal right to express an opinion and as
an opportunity to participate as part of a community, diverse yet united, in
support of democracy. The right to vote is one of the most basic
representations of the core values the American Founders believed in when
they devised the Constitution.3 Yet, even today, the right to vote is not
universally extended to adult American citizens.4
The states have the province to establish voter qualifications that are “not
discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress,

1. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964).
2. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Election Night Victory Speech in Grant Park (Nov. 4,
2008), in N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 2008, at A1, available at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/
results/president/speeches/obama-victory-speech.html.
3. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17–18 (discussing the Founders’ conception of how important
voting rights were).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B) (2006) (permitting states to remove an individual’s
name from the eligible voter list “by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”).
943
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acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.”5 Federal law
specifically permits states to disenfranchise two classes of adults: convicted
criminals and those with “mental incapacity.”6 While there are arguably public
policy justifications for restricting the voting rights of criminals and the
mentally disabled, any qualification or condition imposed on these individuals’
right to vote must pass a strict scrutiny constitutional analysis and comport
with federal law.7
This Comment focuses on the restricted voting rights of the mentally
disabled and highlights the need to modernize over-inclusive state voting laws
rooted in antiquated understandings of mental illness and general prejudice that
disenfranchise the mentally disabled. It briefly surveys the varying, current
state voting laws that apply to the mentally disabled and outlines the strict
scrutiny constitutional analysis applied to restrictive voting laws.
Within the framework of the strict scrutiny test, the Comment addresses
some common arguments in support of restricting mentally disabled
individuals’ voting rights and reveals the arguments’ likeness to false
arguments made in support of denying women the right to vote in the early
twentieth century. Also within the test’s framework, the Comment discusses
the difficulty of defining a “capacity to vote” and the problem of
discrimination facing the mentally disabled while highlighting parallels to the
discrimination faced by African–Americans in the early to mid-twentieth
century. The women’s and African–American suffrage movements are
historical examples that can help educate our understanding of the destructive
effects of disenfranchisement and encourage individuals to seriously consider
the merits of broadly restricting the mentally disabled from exercising the
fundamental right to vote.8
After identifying the difficulties states face in drafting a constitutional,
restrictive voting law and the inaccuracies of common conceptions and stigma
regarding the abilities of mentally disabled individuals, the Comment
ultimately argues for broader voting rights for the mentally disabled. The
Comment endorses, in large part, a recent ABA recommendation that proposes
taking away a mentally disabled individual’s right to vote only if a court finds

5. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B).
7. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D. Me. 2001) (applying strict scrutiny
analysis to a voting restriction against those under guardianship).
8. The author recognizes policy arguments disenfranchising women over eighty years ago
do not provide perfect comparisons to arguments today disenfranchising the mentally disabled.
Similarly, the discriminatory practices African–Americans faced that prevented their vote do not
perfectly align with discrimination against the mentally disabled today. But the underlying
themes and societal impressions embodied in the policy arguments against allowing women the
right to vote and the discriminatory practices against African–Americans are reflected today in
the disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

MODERNIZING STATE VOTING LAWS

945

by clear and convincing evidence the individual cannot communicate, with or
without accommodation, a specific desire to participate in the electoral
process.9 The Comment goes on to suggest that eliminating language that
welcomes discriminatory discretion is vital to an improved standard and that
federal governmental action may be necessary to ensure broader voting rights
for the mentally disabled.
Section I gives a brief evolution of social stigmas and prejudices at the root
of original restrictive state voting laws, many of which still linger today. It
also reviews common aspects of various current state voting laws, including
how some restrict the franchise. Lastly, it outlines the strict scrutiny
constitutional analysis courts apply to state laws that restrict voting rights of a
particular class.
Section II discusses the problems of defining a “capacity to vote” standard
under the strict scrutiny requirements and in the face of discretionary
discrimination when the standard is implemented. It details the historical
voting discrimination African–Americans faced and the policy enacted to fight
it.
Section III addresses common arguments against expanding voting rights
for the mentally disabled and whether they implicate compelling state interests
under the strict scrutiny analysis. It also highlights the arguments’ similarities
to early twentieth-century arguments against granting voting rights to women.
Lastly, Section IV offers a policy recommendation to extend the franchise
to a broader group of mentally disabled individuals. It suggests mentally
disabled individuals should be presumed able to vote and only lose the right if
the individual cannot communicate, with or without accommodations, a desire
to participate in the electoral process. It also indicates effective reform may
require federal action.
I. VOTING BARRIERS FACING THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE STRICT
SCRUTINY CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A.

State Law Disenfranchisement

United States history has been characterized by granting voting rights to
increasing numbers of the population.10 Individuals with mental disabilities,
however, remain one of the few groups singled out for disenfranchisement.11

9. See American Bar Association Recommendation and Report, from Symposium:
Facilitating Voting as People Age: Implications of Cognitive Impairment 1 (Aug. 13, 2007),
www.abanet.org/aging/docs/Voting_Rec_FINAL_approved.doc
[hereinafter
ABA
Recommendation].
10. Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote. I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 51
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 849, 849 (2000).
11. Id.
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As noted above, federal law specifically identifies convicted criminals and the
mentally disabled as two classes a state can choose to disenfranchise.12 Most
states restrict the franchise for certain mentally disabled individuals.13 Many
of those state laws use antiquated, vague, or broad categorical language
reflecting century-old prejudices and misconceptions about the abilities of
mentally disabled individuals.14
The current disenfranchisement of the mentally disabled stems from a
history of “grotesque” societal treatment.15 In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, medical authorities portrayed the mentally disabled as a
“menace to society and civilization” who were “responsible in a large degree
for many, if not all, . . . social problems.”16 Large “institutions” were built to
isolate the mentally disabled and prevent them from reproducing.17 Mentally
disabled children were believed to be uneducable and dangerous.18 In the
voting realm, politicians sought to exclude the mentally disabled based on a
desire to ensure the voting public made “informed and intelligent political
decisions.”19 In fact, “As of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified
‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion
to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.”20
The vast majority of states today have constitutional provisions or statutes
that deny certain mentally disabled individuals the right to vote.21 Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania are among the few states that do not
disqualify any residents from voting based on a mental disability.22 Most

12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B).
13. See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STATE LAWS AFFECTING THE
VOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2008), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/
voter_qualification_chart6-08.pdf [hereinafter BAZELON STATE LAWS].
14. See id.; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-12(a) (2008) (“No mentally incompetent person
shall be admitted as an elector.”); HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“No person who is non compos
mentis shall be qualified to vote.”).
15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 462.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 462–63.
19. Leonard Holmes, Voting Laws Discriminate Against Mentally Disabled, Oct. 2000,
http://mentalhealth.about.com/cs/legalissues/a/vote1000.htm
[hereinafter
Voting
Laws
Discriminate].
20. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 464.
21. BAZELON STATE LAWS, supra note 10.
22. Id.; see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-412(3)(j) (2007) (allowing developmentally disabled
individual to vote); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2006) (governing “Qualification of Voters”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-26-2-8(a)(1)(F) (LexisNexis 2006) (“Detention or commitment of an individual
under this article does not deprive the individual of . . . the right to . . . vote.”); 48 Pa. Op. Att’y
Gen. 128 (1973) (“The mentally retarded or mentally ill cannot be disenfranchised merely
because they are undergoing treatment for a mental disability.”). An employee of the Illinois

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

MODERNIZING STATE VOTING LAWS

947

states label ineligible individuals “mentally incompetent,”23 “non compos
mentis,”24 or “of unsound mind.”25 But a number of state laws still include old,
stigmatic terms such as “idiots” and “insane persons.”26
The procedure to determine which mentally disabled individuals may and
may not vote varies widely by state. In Florida, all individuals placed under
guardianship27 must be evaluated for voting disqualification.28 In other words,
Florida residents under guardianship are categorically presumed not capable to
vote. In Hawaii, a “clerk” must investigate whether a person deemed
“incapacitated . . . lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning voting” before the person
retains his or her right to vote.29 In Iowa, a court must decide whether each
individual under guardianship “lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend
and exercise the right to vote.”30 Lastly, in California, a court must find that an

Cook County Clerk’s office noted, “Voting is a personal right and we don’t erect any prohibitions
[related to mental capacity].” Erin G. Edwards, Group Pushes Voting Rights for Mentally
Impaired, Jan. 15, 2008, http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=74603.
23. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-12(a) (2008).
24. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
25. BAZELON STATE LAWS, supra note 10; see, e.g., MONT. CONST. art IV, § 2.
26. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (disqualifying “insane or not mentally competent”);
MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (“Idiots and insane persons [are not] qualified elector[s].”).
Interestingly, Kentucky differentiates between the terms “incompetent” and “insane,” noting an
incompetent person can register to vote as long as the person has not been declared insane. KY.
CONST. § 145, cl. 3 (“Idiots and insane persons shall not have the right to vote.”). Also,
Vermont’s Constitution is particularly unique requiring that persons must be of “quiet and
peaceable behavior” to be able to vote. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42.
27. A “guardian” is “one who has the legal authority and duty to care for another’s person or
property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004). A guardian may be appointed to a
mentally disabled individual for all or for specific decision-making purposes. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331(3)(d)(2) (West 2005).
29. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-23(a) (LexisNexis 2006). In a unique provision that
requires “understand[ing],” all Wisconsin residents must be able to “understand[] the elective
process” in order to vote. Id. All Wisconsin residents are presumed to have this understanding
except those under guardianship. WIS. STAT. § 6.03(3) (2009). A court must “expressly” find an
individual under guardianship capable of understanding the elective process. Id. § 6.03(1)(a).
New Jersey also has an understanding requirement that was instituted as part of a 2007
constitutional amendment. N.J. CONST. art 2, § 1, ¶ 6.
30. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.556 (West 2003). Delaware law also requires a court finding to
take away the right to vote. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 15, § 1701 (2007). It defines “adjudged
mentally incompetent” as “a specific finding in a judicial guardianship or equivalent proceeding,
based on clear and convincing evidence that the individual has a severe cognitive impairment
which precludes exercise of basic voting judgment.” Id.
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individual under conservatorship31 cannot complete a voter registration
affidavit before taking away the individual’s right to vote.32
This brief review of current state voting laws reveals many laws contain
vague terms and sweeping categorizations and require individual voting
officials to make difficult discretionary determinations. Recent referenda to
amend older state voting laws have mostly failed.33 As a result, many current
voting laws play a role in perpetuating prejudices, stigmas, and misconceptions
that were at the root of the original state voting prohibitions.34 Yet, most of
these impressions do not reflect the current, widely accepted medical
understandings of the capabilities of many mentally disabled individuals.35
Furthermore, the laws’ vagaries and broad categorizations threaten the laws’
constitutionality under a strict scrutiny analysis.
B.

Strict Scrutiny Constitutional Framework

In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,36 the Supreme
Court stated the federal Constitution “established and guaranteed” the right to
vote.37 But the Court also asserted the individual states have the power to
establish voting standards as long as they are not discriminatory and do not
contravene any congressionally-made law.38
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,39 the Supreme Court
announced for the first time it would apply a strict scrutiny test when it
assessed the constitutionality of a law limiting an individual’s right to vote.40
The Court stated, “[O]nce the franchise [to vote] is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”41 The Court also recognized the
evolving nature of the Constitution stating, “[T]he Equal Protection Clause is
not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what
31. A “conservator” and a “guardian” are synonymous as are a “conservatorship” and a
“guardianship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (8th ed. 2004).
32. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2008, 2209 (West 2003).
33. Voting Laws Discriminate, supra note 16. One notable judicial exception is Doe v.
Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001), where the court found a Maine constitutional
provision categorically denying voting rights to individuals under guardianship unconstitutional
under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
34. Holmes, supra note 19.
35. Kay Schriner et al., The Last Suffrage Movement: Voting Rights for Persons with
Cognitive and Emotional Disabilities, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 75, 88 (1997).
36. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
37. Id. at 51.
38. Id.
39. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
40. Id. at 670; see Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a
Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1176 (2007).
41. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.
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lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality, . . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”42 Noting the right to
vote is “precious” and “fundamental,” the Harper Court ruled, “[W]here
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized
and carefully confined.”43
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,44 the Court more clearly
outlined the requirements of the Equal Protection strict scrutiny test and
reasons why the test applied to voting laws.45 The Court set out the first part of
the test stating: “[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some
bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to
others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest.”46 Subsequently, the Court articulated the
second part of the test stating that the “classification” of those excluded from
voting “must be tailored so that the exclusion of [those individuals] is
necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.”47 The Court went on to
explain the reason the strict scrutiny test applied to restrictive voting laws:
[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the
franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any
unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political
affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
48
representative government.

In Dunn v. Blumstein,49 the Court further delineated its Equal Protection
strict scrutiny analysis into three primary foci: (1) “the character of the
classification in question;” (2) “the individual interests affected by the
classification;” and (3) “the governmental interests asserted in support of the
classification.”50

42. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 670.
44. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
45. Id. at 626.
46. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
47. Harper, 383 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added). The Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, described
this part of the test stating, “Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
‘precision,’ and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate objectives.” 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)
(citations omitted).
48. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted).
49. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
50. Id. at 335.
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In sum, to pass an Equal Protection strict scrutiny test and be found
constitutional, state laws that classify certain individuals ineligible to vote must
be necessarily or narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.51
Furthermore, if the state’s goals can be achieved in other reasonable ways that
lessen the voting restrictions, the state must implement the less restrictive
option.52 It is essential to know the high burden states must meet to
disenfranchise a class of voters in order to fairly analyze the legitimacy and
appropriateness of state voting laws restricting the voting rights of the mentally
disabled.
II. NARROWLY TAILORING THE DEFINITION OF CAPACITY AND THE PROBLEM
OF DISCRIMINATION
This section analyzes specific issues that arise when the strict scrutiny
standard is applied to voting laws restricting the rights of the mentally
disabled. First it explains the difficulty of defining the “capacity” one must
possess to be able to vote. Second, it points out that a well-defined, narrowly
tailored capacity standard may pass constitutional scrutiny but is vulnerable to
discretionary discrimination by individuals implementing the standard. The
voting discrimination faced by African–Americans during the early and
middle-twentieth century provides a useful parallel to discrimination against
the mentally disabled and a guide for how the discrimination problem has been
mitigated in the past.
A.

Defining the Capacity to Vote—An Exercise in Policy, Not Science

Defining what it means to be capable to vote is a major difficulty
embedded in most state voting laws. As already discussed, most states are
sufficiently concerned about mentally disabled voters that they have passed
voting laws with capability standards.53 Yet, a broad standard will likely result
in over-inclusion and be unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test.54 Thus,
states must develop a standard that satisfies their interests in restricting the
franchise while avoiding over inclusion as much as possible.
Throughout the legal system, capacity standards vary by area of law and
the function regulated, resulting in individuals being “legally capable” of

51. See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.
52. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
53. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. However, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana and
Pennsylvania have avoided the “capacity” policy dilemma by not restricting voting rights based
on mental disability. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text explaining the utmost importance of
preserving an individual citizen’s right to vote.
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performing certain functions but not others.55 The particular level of capacity
required to perform a certain legal function often depends on the type of
transaction involved or the nature of the decision-making authority required.56
For example, a person can be placed under guardianship when deemed
incapable of entering into various transactions but still retain the legal authority
“to exercise certain core decision-making authority” without further court
rulings.57
In essence, defining the criteria for “voting capacity” is an exercise in
policy, not science.58 There is “no scientifically determinable point” on the
spectrum of people’s capacities where one can say a person has sufficient
capacity to vote.59 Thus, when a state establishes a capacity requirement, it
should reflect “the importance of allowing persons to perform the task even in
the face of some degree of impairment, tallied against the weight of concerns
regarding the possible adverse outcomes of the task if performed by someone
whose capacity may be impaired.”60 This is essentially a determination of how
to allocate the risk of error.61
In the context of restricting the right to vote, the Supreme Court in Kramer
succinctly conveyed the utmost importance of preserving an individual’s right
to vote.62 Meanwhile, it has been argued that any harm in allowing marginally
incapable people to vote is small compared to the harm of preventing capable
people from exercising their fundamental right to vote.63 Support for this
claim comes from studies showing a substantial portion of Americans’ political
discourse circumvents the conscious mind altogether.64 Indeed, “a range of
irrelevant factors and fortuities—such as a candidate’s height, whether he uses
a nickname, or the format of the ballot” drive many citizens’ political views
and choices.65

55. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy
and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2003). Standards regulating capacity
are not monolithic—just because one does not have the capacity to contract does not mean the
individual cannot write a will or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 323.
56. Id. at 325.
57. Id. at 325–26.
58. Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 962 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. See Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing Competency as a Construction of Difference: A
Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of Persons with Disabilities, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867,
871–72 (1993).
64. Pamela S. Karlan, Framing Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals,
38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 917 (2007).
65. Id.
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State laws categorically denying voting rights to persons under
guardianship seemingly are not narrowly tailored and in all likelihood are
drastically overinclusive.66 Other state laws that avoid categorical restrictions
provide less restrictive alternatives that, under the strict scrutiny analysis, must
be implemented in place of the more restrictive option.67
The great harm of an overinclusive capacity definition, the limited harm of
an underinclusive capacity definition, and the constitutional requirement to
narrowly tailor the disenfranchised class push states to whittle voting capacity
requirements to a bare minimum.68 But even if a state establishes a suitable,
precise voting capacity standard, it still must present a compelling interest to
warrant the voting rights restriction.69 This Comment will consider potential
compelling state interests in a later section. It will now address the problem of
discrimination destroying the intended protections of a narrowly tailored
voting law.
B.

Discriminatory Discretion Preventing the Exercise of Voting

As explained above, many states currently require individual capacity
assessments to determine whether a mentally disabled individual has the
Depending on the state, these
requisite mental capacity to vote.70
determinations may be made by a clerk, judge, or some other professional.71
Pervasive attitudes and stigmas that mentally disabled individuals, as a
class, cannot think independently or make basic decisions have a strong
likelihood of influencing a clerk’s or a judge’s determination.72 Vague
capacity definitions are particularly susceptible to discretionary abuse and,

66. See, e.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001) (holding Maine’s
categorical disenfranchisement of individuals under guardianship “is not narrowly tailored”
because it would disenfranchise “many more persons under guardianship” than it intended). The
Court indicated individuals may be placed under guardianship for reasons that would not bring
their ability to vote into question. Id. at 54–55.
67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Of course, a state only has to implement a
less restrictive policy if it will serve its professed compelling interest.
68. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 58, at 965.
69. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. See also Schriner, supra note 35, at 93–
94 (noting that allowing any professional, including psychiatrists and psychologists, to determine
when an individual is capable to vote does not remove the influence of bias or prejudice—
professional judgments in this respect are merely “sanctified version[s] of the same underlying
prejudice” held by lay persons).
72. See Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 849; see also Schriner, supra note 35, at 90
(highlighting the American historical tendency to apply “objective” voting requirements
discriminatorily, particularly with regard to African–Americans and women).
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historically, have operated as “exclusionary project[s].”73 Accordingly, “A
supposedly neutral finding of incapacity can be driven by bias and used
instrumentally by a court or [other entity] to insure the individual in question
behaves in a prescribed manner.”74
Similarly, during the African–American suffrage movement in the early
and mid-twentieth century, stigma, misconceptions about ability, and general
distaste for African–Americans motivated the discriminatory efforts of local
voting officials.75 The frequency and scope of voting discrimination against
African–Americans was generally greater and more pronounced than it is
against the mentally disabled,76 but the movement still provides a useful
comparison for multiple reasons. First, the African–American suffrage
movement highlights the devastating power discrimination can have over a
minority trying to exercise its rights. Second, it reveals public policy options
to address the problem of discrimination and modernize state voting laws.
1.

Discretionary Discrimination—Literacy Tests and Beyond

All African–American men were granted the constitutional right to vote
with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.77 However, African–
Americans, particularly in the South, were systematically denied the right to
vote through coercion and legal obstructions.78 It was not until 1965 and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act that the legal barriers of literacy tests and
discriminatory practices were directly addressed and African–Americans had a
legitimate voice at the polls.79
Literacy tests gained popularity well before the 1960’s Civil Rights
Movement.80 Northern states adopted literacy tests in the mid to late 1800s to
“produce a more competent electorate” and effectively “weed out sizeable

73. Knauer, supra note 55, at 324. Knauer notes: “The concept of legal capacity has
traditionally been an exclusionary project under which certain classes of individuals were by
definition incapable of legal agency.” Id. She also states feminism and critical race studies have
brought out a deep skepticism for the state’s protective impulses expressed through the concept of
legal capacity. Id.
74. Id. at 342.
75. See infra notes 77–91 and accompanying text.
76. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 58
(2000).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2; Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right
to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 525 (1973) [hereinafter Derfner, Racial Discrimination].
78. Celinda Lake, Muted Voices: A Comparative Perspective of Women’s and Blacks’
Voting Participation, in VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: CONTINUING THE QUEST FOR FULL
PARTICIPATION 129, 131 (Karen McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor eds., 1992).
79. Id.
80. Cristina M. Rodríguez, From Litigation, Legislation: A Review of Brian Landsberg’s
Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 1132,
1142–43 (2008) (book review).
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numbers of poor immigrant voters.”81 However, in the South, literacy tests
became a “psychological obstruction” that suppressed African–American
voting rights because of the discriminatory practices of Southern voting
officials and African–Americans’ inferior education.82
Literacy tests were adopted essentially by every southern state except
Texas and Florida.83 The tests required voter applicants to read or write any
section of the applicable state constitution or the U.S. Constitution to the
satisfaction of the registrar.84 Faced with concerns that literacy tests would
disenfranchise many illiterate whites, the tests—admittedly—were never
intended to operate honestly.85 The key to their “success” was that they were
designed to give the local registrar “an elastic standard to implement the
avowed intention of disenfranching blacks but not whites.”86
Before and during the 1960s, Southern African–Americans faced what has
been described as “[t]he grim determination of the southern politician never to
allow [them] to take part in politics—[their] education, economic progress and
moral fitness, notwithstanding . . . .”87 Local “princes and dukes,” the
registrars and clerks, had total discretion to discriminate as they pleased.88
Local white registrars would closely review African–American citizens’
applications and deny them for technical errors that bore no relation to the
applicant’s qualifications.89 The same registrars that discriminated against
African–Americans would help illiterate white voters fill out an application
and then approve it.90 Tactics like these continued until Congress finally
intervened.91
81. Id. at 1143. Literacy tests were justified because voters who could not read “labor[ed]
. . . under mental incapacity” and thus should not vote. Id.
82. Id. at 1144.
83. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 537.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 537–38. Senator Carter Glass was noted as saying white Southerners obey the
letter of the Fifteenth Amendment but “frankly evade the spirit thereof—and propose to continue
doing so. White supremacy is too precious a thing to surrender for the sake of a theoretical
justice that would let a brutish African deem himself the equal of white men and women in
Dixie.” Mary Frances Berry, Voting, Voting Rights, and Political Power in American History, in
VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA, supra note 78, at 63, 69.
86. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 538.
87. Berry, supra note 85, at 69.
88. Armand Derfner, Development of the Franchise: 1957–1980, in VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA, supra note 78, at 91, 92 [hereinafter Derfner, Development of the Franchise].
89. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1143. Some registrars failed African–American applicants
for misspellings. Id. Others were prevented from voting for not reporting their age to the day,
rather than the year. Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 92. In Virginia, a
state law required that individuals fill out their registration without assistance, so Virginia
registrars would not let African–Americans read the questions. Id.
90. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1139.
91. Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 92.
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Federal Action and Changing Priorities

The Department of Justice voting rights litigation that preceded the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 revealed such rights for African–Americans could not be
secured unless the value of access to a ballot was prioritized above other
objectives, such as ensuring an intelligent electorate.92 The litigation also
made clear that protecting African–American voters from discrimination
required a regulatory system that applied to all jurisdictions, rather than trying
to protect rights in case-by-case litigation.93
Congress directly addressed Southern officials’ intentional discrimination
through the Voting Rights Act of 1965.94 The Act outlawed literacy tests and
any other “test or device” to determine voter eligibility for five years.95 Also,
and perhaps more importantly, the Act authorized the Attorney General to
designate federal examiners to register voters and federal observers to attend
elections if the Attorney General felt local officials were not complying with
the Act.96 The Act’s provisions reflect the first time Congress acknowledged
the intended discriminatory purpose of instituting literacy tests in the South.97
While banning literacy tests was at the heart of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the key to the Act was taking the control of the voting process out of the
hands of local officials that had overtly discriminated for decades.98 The Act
acknowledged African–Americans’ right to vote was a national concern that
had to be protected at a national level.99

92. Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1146.
93. Id.
94. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et
seq. (1970)); Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 550.
95. Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 438; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at
551.
96. Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 439, 439–41; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note
77, at 551.
97. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 552.
98. Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 94.
99. Id. President Lyndon B. Johnson was a strong advocate for the passage of the 1965
Voting Rights Act. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 205 (Frederick D. Drake &
Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999). Upon writing to Congress urging them to pass the Act, he noted the
Constitution prohibits withholding the right to vote based on race and stated:
We have all sworn an oath before God to support and to defend [the] Constitution . . . .
This bill will strike down restrictions to voting in all elections . . . which have been used
to deny Negroes the right to vote. This bill will establish a simple, uniform standard
which cannot be used, however ingenious the effort, to flout our Constitution . . . . There
is no constitutional issue here. The command of the Constitution is plain. There is no
moral issue, It [sic] is wrong—deadly wrong—to deny any of your fellow Americans the
right to vote. There is no issue of states’ rights or national rights. There is only the
struggle for human rights.
Id. at 206.
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The Act not only outlawed tests that were discriminatory in purpose but
also those discriminatory in effect.100 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
Congress’s intent in Gaston County v. United States,101 ruling North Carolina’s
fairly administered literacy test had a discriminatory effect on African–
Americans because the county had systematically deprived African–Americans
equal educational opportunities, leaving them unequally prepared to meet the
test’s requirements.102 The Court held literacy tests, used as a voting
requirement, were unconstitutional in voting districts that operated segregated
schools.103 One could argue the Gaston decision indicated the Court
prioritized African–Americans’ access to the ballot above ensuring an
intelligent electorate.
Just after Gaston, Congress passed an extension of the Voting Rights Act
in 1970.104 The extension temporarily (and later permanently) banned literacy
tests nationwide.105 This provision reflected the changing and increased
appreciation for an individual’s right to vote.106 It also signified that illiterate
people have as much right and ability to vote as anyone else.107
Thus, two themes characterize the response to the widespread,
discretionary voting discrimination in the early and mid twentieth century.
First, it became clear that there was a need for a federal standard to curb the
discriminatory exercise of discretion by local officials against African–
Americans. Second, states and society in general recognized that ensuring an
“educated electorate” was not, or should not be, its highest priority when
framing voting laws. Next, this Comment considers whether popular
arguments for restricting the voting rights of the mentally disabled, like an
interest in an “educated electorate,” may be a compelling state interest under
strict scrutiny analysis.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDING THE VOTING RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED—COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS?
Common arguments made to deny broader voting rights for the mentally
disabled include: (1) their disability prevents them from being full

100. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 563.
101. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
102. Id. at 296–97; see Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 563.
103. Gaston County, 395 U.S. at 296–97; see Rodríguez, supra note 80, at 1144.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970); see also Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 565.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a; see also Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at
95. In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to suspend literacy tests
nationwide. 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970). All the Justices agreed Congress could use a broad
remedy for a widespread problem even if literacy tests in some areas may not be discriminatory.
See id.; Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 566.
106. See Derfner, Development of the Franchise, supra note 88, at 95.
107. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

MODERNIZING STATE VOTING LAWS

957

participatory members of society; (2) they lack the mental capacity to
participate in politics; and (3) their interests are vicariously represented by
other individuals and groups acting in their best interests.108
Each of these arguments resembles similar judgments women’s suffrage
activists had to overcome.109 While some of these arguments may be more
valid when applied to the mentally disabled rather than women, they still
contain important deficiencies. Ultimately, the arguments would not likely
constitute or support a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny
constitutional analysis.
A.

Challenging Traditional Notions of Societal Placement

The historical treatment and resulting public perceptions of the mentally
disabled gave rise to the widely held notion that mentally disabled persons
cannot be full members of society.110 The General Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) broadly summarize some of these
treatments and perceptions.111 Congress noted that the disabled have
historically been isolated and segregated from the rest of society112 and have
been subjected to “purposeful unequal treatment.”113 Congress also concluded
that the disabled have been “relegated to a position of political
powerlessness . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society.”114
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged and recounted the “historic
mistreatment, indifference, and hostility” resulting from notions that the
mentally disabled could not contribute to society.115 In Olmstead v. L.C., the
Court recognized that the institutionalization of individuals, who can receive
appropriate treatment in a community setting, merely perpetuates unwarranted
historical assumptions that those in institutions “are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life.”116 Furthermore, the Court noted that the

108. See Holmes, supra note 19.
109. See infra Part III.A–C.
110. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text.
111. See 42 U.S.C. §12101(a) (2006).
112. Id. §12101(a)(2).
113. Id. §12101(a)(7).
114. Id.
115. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (majority opinion). Interestingly, and perhaps to add
perspective, the Court, like this Comment, supported its assertion regarding discrimination
against the mentally disabled by citing comparisons, quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984), which highlighted the stigmatizing injury of racial discrimination, and Los Angeles Dept.
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which discussed the harmful affects of
gender discrimination arising from gender stereotypes. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
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practical consequences of institutionalization, including diminished “social
contacts, work options, economic independence, [and] educational
advancement,” continue to engender stigmas against the mentally disabled.117
The Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.118 addressed
the “‘lengthy and tragic’ history of segregation and discrimination” of the
mentally disabled in relation to racial discrimination against African–
Americans.119 The Court referenced state mandated “segregation and
degradation” of the mentally disabled that “rivaled, and . . . paralleled, the
worst excesses of Jim Crow” in “virulence and bigotry,”120 specifically citing a
1920 Mississippi law deeming the mentally disabled “unfit for citizenship.”121
Ultimately, the Court concluded: “Most important[ly], lengthy and continuing
isolation of the retarded has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and
stereotyping that long have plagued them.”122
Like the mentally disabled, women faced isolation and limited citizenship
in their struggle for voting rights. Women and men who opposed women’s
suffrage often claimed a woman’s “sphere of influence was primarily
domestic” and politics and voting were strictly a male concern.123 Women’s
isolation, rather than in hospitals or wards, was in their home. Confining
women to the “domestic sphere” was justified by arguments that women’s
childbearing nature made them more suitable for domestic life than the
contentious world of politics.124 The traditional conception of the family
required a woman’s attention to children and the home while her husband
engaged in civil activities.125
Under this conception, women did not need to be involved in matters
outside the home, and if they were, it “would harm the marriage relationship”
and the entire family unit.126 Even when “suffragists invoked American
traditions of individualism, ‘self-government,’ and ‘self-representation’ in

117. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601.
118. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
119. Id. at 461–64.
120. Id. at 462.
121. Id. at 463.
122. Id. at 464. The Court further compared the lasting nature of racial discrimination to
discrimination against the mentally disabled citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 303, 395 (1978), for its discussion of Jim Crow-era discrimination and then asserting,
“[p]rejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461, 464.
123. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 148.
124. Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking Law into Their Own Hands: Voting Women During
Reconstruction, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67, 68 (Donald W.
Rogers ed., 1990).
125. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 979 (2002). Historically, the chief purpose of American
women in general was to be a wife, mother, and homemaker. DuBois, supra note 124, at 68.
126. Siegel, supra note 125, at 951.
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defense of the right to vote,” they were met with traditional concerns about
maintaining familial roles.127
B.

Insufficient Mental Capacity

Many believe someone with a mental health diagnosis is intrinsically
irrational and incapable of participating in civic functions, but mental
disabilities do not necessarily reduce a person’s intelligence.128 Many mental
disabilities that affect social skills or ability to care for one’s self have no
relation to a person’s ability to make decisions or understand concepts.129
While some severe mental disabilities can inhibit individuals from making
basic decisions or comprehension, by no means do the vast majority of people
with mental disabilities lose these functions.130
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would consider ensuring an
“intelligent” electorate a compelling interest.131 In Dunn, the Court indicated
there would be problems associated with such an interest stating, “We note that
the criterion of ‘intelligent’ voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of
abuse.”132 The Court also referenced the 1970 Voting Rights Act and stated,
“Congress declared [it] federal policy that people should be allowed to vote
even if they were not well informed about the issues.”133
Regardless, studies and other evidence show that persons with mental
disabilities can make reasoned judgments about political issues, which calls
into question the validity of whether excluding them would make the electorate
any more intelligent.134 This point gains further credence, knowing that many

127. Id. at 981.
128. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850.
129. See, e.g., Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 88–89 (giving multiple examples of evidence
that the mentally disabled are capable of making sound political decisions); see also Robert M.
Levy & Leonard S. Rubenstein, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 292 (1996)
(citing a study that showed almost all individuals in a psychiatric hospital who had diagnoses of
psychotic or major affective disorders held opinions about the 1991 Gulf War similar to those of
the American public). For example, Sebastian Go registered to vote and researched political
races when he turned eighteen despite being under guardianship for bipolar disorder, Asperger’s
syndrome, and brain injury. Pam Belluck, States Face Decisions on Who Is Mentally Fit to Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2007, at A1. His mother noted just because he needs someone to manage
his money and make his medical decisions does not mean Sebastian cannot make a political
decision. Id.
130. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850.
131. Schriner, supra note 35, at 87.
132. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356 (1972). The Court explicitly stated it was not
“deciding as a general matter the extent to which a state can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent
citizens from the franchise.” Id.
133. Id. at 357 n.29.
134. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 89. Examples include institutionalized individuals
endorsing a candidate for governor due in part to his commitment to disability rights, and a study
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voters have little knowledge of the issues and make choices based on
emotional reactions and other “irrational judgments.”135
Women also faced arguments that they were “too unintelligent, [and] too
uninformed” to exercise political judgment.136 Those spearheading the
women’s suffrage movement, like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, asserted that
women were not intellectually inferior to men and could participate in
politics.137 Yet, to many, women “lacked the capacity for managing public
affairs.”138 Only citizens with the “requisite degree of independence to vote
their own judgment” had the “capacity” to vote responsibly.139 Women,
beholden to their husbands and relegated to a strict familial role, were not so
“independent.”140 There were additional concerns that, if burdened with duties
outside the home, women could not fulfill their obligations in the home.141
These broad characterizations about women’s capabilities are now “almost
entirely absent from public thought” but still bear a striking resemblance to
“the assumptions underlying voting prohibitions on persons with cognitive and
emotional impairments.”142
C. Virtual Representation
Finally, people have argued that persons under guardianship can be
politically represented by their guardian, who is professionally responsible for
working in the individual’s best interest. This argument guarantees mentally
disabled persons the status of a second-rate citizen and ignores the

that found the voting patterns of mentally disabled individuals were strongly related to
socioeconomic factors. Id. at 88–89.
135. Id. at 89. The government has recognized since the Federalist Papers that voters often
behave selfishly, prejudicially, and irrationally. Karlan, supra note 64, at 925. The fact that
mentally disabled individuals may not process information in a sophisticated or entirely rational
manner may separate them only in degree, if at all, from the rest of the electorate. Id. Schriner,
Ochs, and Shields thus conclude: “It cannot be argued, therefore, that people with cognitive or
emotional disabilities should be prevented from voting simply because they are presumed to be
incapable of gathering, comprehending, and applying the information necessary to act
intelligently, given that the vast majority of other voters appear to be similarly ‘handicapped.’”
Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 89. See also Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850 (“During the
1992 presidential campaign, 86 percent of the American people knew that George Bush’s dog’s
name was Millie, but only 15 percent were aware that both he and Bill Clinton supported the
death penalty.”).
136. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 90.
137. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 147–48. In fact, to
prove her point, Ms. Stanton ran for Congress. Id. at 148.
138. Siegel, supra note 125, at 979.
139. Id. at 980.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 979.
142. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 90.
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foundational American value of individual independence.143
Ordway
concludes that “a democratic government’s authority derives from the people,”
and voting is the vehicle to grant such authority.144 Displacing the right to vote
not only limits the accountability of elected officials to the people, but it
“undermines the people’s ability to check the performance of their elected
officials.”145 Absent this safeguard, “the entire democratic enterprise loses its
legitimacy.”146
Also, professionals acting politically on behalf of the mentally disabled are
often motivated by compassion and sympathy rather than for advocacy of
rights based protections against majoritarian action.147 It is short sighted to
believe that guardians or other professionals would provide a suitable
democratic check on elected officials from the minority group perspective of a
mentally disabled individual.148
In the women’s suffrage context, the theory of virtual representation arose
from the traditional conception that the family was a “reasonable unit of
political representation.”149 The notion that women’s political interests were
represented by their husbands was the impetus for the women’s suffrage
movement.150 This belief reflected societal norms from the time of the
Founding Fathers, which extended well into the twentieth century, that women
only tended to intra-family matters.151 In 1866, a United States Congressman
stated: “[T]he women of America vote by faithful and true representatives,
their husbands, their brothers, their sons; and no true man will go to the polls
and deposit his ballot without remembering the true and loving constituency
that he has at home.”152
It was understood that if the men in a family had a right to vote, the women
were represented.153 Ultimately, despite sharing a lack of voting rights with
African–Americans, women were viewed to be in a much better position than
African–Americans: “[White women] are in high fellowship with those that do
govern, who, to a great extent, act as their agents, their friends, promoting their
143. Id. at 82 (discussing the “troubling” suggestion that professionals could serve as political
proxies for the mentally disabled).
144. Ordway, supra note 40, at 1188.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Schriner et al., supra note 35, at 83. See also Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 850 (stating
broadening the franchise would increase the political clout of the mentally disabled as a class
which could help improve the terribly insufficient institutional and community-based mental
health services).
148. Schriner, supra note 35, at 83.
149. Siegel, supra note 125, at 984.
150. Id. at 948.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 985–86 (citation omitted).
153. Id. at 981.
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interests in every vote they give, and therefore communities get along very
well without conferring [voting rights] upon the female.”154
Uncomforted, the leaders of the suffrage movement challenged the notion
of virtual representation.155 In an 1871 Petition to Congress to appear in person
and claim their right to vote, the suffragists stated: “[W]omen who are allowed
no vote and therefore no representation cannot truly be heard except as
congress shall open its doors to us in person.”156 The suffragists focused on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to “all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.”157 They argued, as persons, women were
equal citizens to men and that voting was one of the “privileges and
immunities” of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.158 But this
argument and the others were generally rebuked until the Nineteenth
Amendment was finally ratified in 1920, granting women the equal right to
vote.159
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO MODERNIZE RESTRICTIVE VOTING LAWS
This Comment has identified some of the major problems with current
state laws that disenfranchise the mentally disabled under a strict scrutiny
constitutional analysis: (1) the difficulties of trying to define capacity, (2)
vague categorical language susceptible to discretionary discrimination, and (3)
deficient arguments supporting broad disenfranchisement.
It has also
repeatedly highlighted the general public’s deeply rooted prejudices and
misconceptions regarding the mental abilities of the mentally disabled that
underlie many current restrictive voting laws.
In 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates
approved a Voting Recommendation that combats many of the problems noted
above.160 The ABA writes:

154. Siegel, supra note 125, at 985.
155. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 99, at 148–49.
156. Id. at 149.
157. DuBois, supra note 124, at 70.
158. Id. at 72. The anti-suffragists tried to keep Congress from paying attention to the
suffragists’ requests as long as possible. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra
note 99, at 163. During World War I, anti-suffragists petitioned Congress to ignore the suffrage
issue until after the war, claiming the suffrage movement was “harassing . . . its public men and
. . . distracting . . . its people from work for the war . . . .” Id. at 163.
159. Siegel, supra note 125, at 952–53. In addition to their constitutional arguments focused
on individualism, suffragists argued that virtual representation effectively created a status
inequality based on sex, making “all men sovereigns and all women subjects.” Id. at 990. While
the focus of suffragists’ arguments changed to a degree as the movement evolved, id. at 993, their
underlying message steadfastly remained consistent: that “men could not and did not represent
women” at the polls. Id. at 991.
160. ABA Recommendation, supra note 9, at 1.
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State constitutions and statutes that permit exclusion of a person from voting
on the basis of mental incapacity, including guardianship and election laws,
should explicitly state that the right to vote is retained, except by court order
where the following criteria must be met:
(1) The exclusion is based on a determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(2) Appropriate due process protections have been afforded;
(3) The court finds that the person cannot communicate, with or without
accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the voting process; and
(4) The findings are established by clear and convincing evidence.161

First, this Recommendation eliminates categorical disenfranchisement
based on guardianship. Mentally disabled persons who have successfully
registered to vote are presumed, like all other registered citizens, to have the
right to vote unlike those current state laws that presume individuals under
guardianship do not have the right to vote.162
Second, the Recommendation requires a court order to take away an
individual’s right to vote. This provision prevents partisan poll workers or
local election officials from refusing to allow registered individuals to vote,
mitigating the potential affects of discriminatory discretion rooted in societal
prejudice and misconceptions.163
Third, the ABA’s Recommendation further limits the potential affects of
prejudice and misconception by requiring a relatively simple, straightforward
judicial determination. Whether one can communicate a specific desire to
participate in the electoral process is surely easier to decipher than whether one
has the “capacity to vote” as defined by most current state laws. But this
standard is still susceptible to some discretionary discrimination, particularly
with regard to what constitutes a “specific” desire to participate. Nonetheless,
this standard is a clear improvement over most current states’ capacity
requirements.164

161. Id.
162. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. Most states have laws that allow certain
individuals to challenge the qualifications of a potential voter prior to or on the day of an election.
See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, VOTER CHALLENGE STATUTES BY STATE,
(2008), http://www.bazelon.org/pdf/voterchallengelaws10-08.pdf; see also Heather S.
Heidelbaugh et al., Protecting the Integrity of the Polling Place: A Constitutional Defense of Poll
Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 219 (2009) (focusing on private “poll watchers”
and arguing they play a useful role on election process). A discussion of “voter challenge” laws
is beyond the scope of this Comment.
164. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the potential for
discrimination can never be completely eliminated. Discrimination efforts will change depending
on how people determine they can best get around the law. See Derfner, Racial Discrimination,
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The Recommendation also would seemingly come closer to meeting the
“narrowly tailored” requirement of the strict scrutiny test than most current
state laws.165 It incorporates protective language from the ADA, “with or
without reasonable accommodation,”166 a less ambiguous standard than
“capacity to vote,” and imparts a high evidentiary burden, “clear and
convincing evidence,” to take away the individual’s right to vote. These
provisions would appear to greatly limit the over-inclusion that is a hallmark of
many current state laws.
Lastly, the Recommendation serves a state’s interest to preserve the
integrity of the electoral process.167 The recommendation simply requires a
reaffirmation of the desire to vote that every citizen gives each time he or she
registers to vote or visits the polls. Thus, the general requirements that states
enforce on all voters are uncompromised. Furthermore, state laws that prohibit
fraud and coercion would continue to operate as the least restrictive methods,
as required under the strict scrutiny analysis, guarding against contamination of
the electoral process.168
In general, the ABA Recommendation appears to make reasonable
improvements upon the problems most current state voting laws present. Yet
in light of the African–American and women’s suffrage historical examples,
two additional recommendations are worthy of consideration.
First, the term “specific,” as noted above, seemingly presents a good
opportunity for judicial discretion affected by prejudice and misconception to
rear its ugly head. Though the ABA recommendation does not offer particular
guidance regarding what may be considered a “specific desire” to participate,
its stated objective is “to not treat people any differently in voting rights based
on any perceived impairment or other personal characteristic.”169 Yet, despite
this clearly stated non-discriminatory intent, the experiences of African–
Americans and women remind us of the destructive power discrimination can
have when discriminatory efforts are rooted in traditional prejudices and
misconceptions. Differentiating between a “general desire” and a “specific
desire” provides a convenient vehicle for continued discriminatory discretion.

supra note 77, at 552–53 (noting discrimination against African–Americans “shifted” after The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 from voter registration to vote dilution).
165. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
167. The Supreme Court has ruled that states have a compelling interest under the strict
scrutiny analysis to ensure elections are free from undue influence and fraud. Schriner et al.,
supra note 35, at 92.
168. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Schriner, supra note 35, at 92 (noting
prohibiting mentally disabled individuals from voting for fears their votes will be easily
influenced or manipulated is not the least restrictive method available for combating these
improprieties).
169. ABA Recommendation, supra note 9, at 4–5.
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Thus, given the widely held prejudice and misconceptions regarding the
abilities of the mentally disabled, the Recommendation would likely better
serve its stated objective if it removed the term “specific” from its provision.
Second, the ABA Recommendation is an initial step in the direction the
African–American and women’s suffrage movements took to ultimately
achieve their goals—that is, to garner federal attention and seek federal
legislative action. This same direction may be the path to effectively broaden
the voting rights of the mentally disabled. Trying to secure voting rights for
African–Americans through litigation proved largely unsuccessful compared to
the change brought by The Voting Rights Act of 1965.170 Women lobbied
vehemently to appear before Congress knowing the federal legislature was the
key to attaining the right to vote.171 The mentally disabled face widespread
prejudice amongst local citizens and restrictive laws with deep roots, which
mirror the barriers African–Americans and women have faced. Similarly,
federal action may have to replace litigation and state referenda in an effort to
overcome deeply ingrained prejudices and misconceptions overly restricting
the voting rights of the mentally disabled.172
CONCLUSION
“The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for
breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men
because they are different.”173 The mentally disabled is one of two classes of
individuals that states are specifically permitted by federal law to
disenfranchise. Many current state laws contain antiquated, stigmatic terms,
and overly broad provisions that perpetuate prejudices and misconceptions
about the mentally disabled and unduly restrict their right to vote.
All restrictive state voting laws must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest to be constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis.
The discrimination faced by African–Americans seeking to vote during the
early and mid-twentieth century and the arguments made to prevent women
from voting prior to the Nineteenth Amendment parallel discrimination and

170. Derfner, Racial Discrimination, supra note 77, at 550.
171. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
172. Congressional action regarding voting issues is not relegated to the distant past.
Congress recently addressed voting issues related to the disabled in the 2002 Help America Vote
Act which provides for educating election officials, poll workers, and volunteers about the voting
rights of the disabled as part of a broad effort to improve voting systems nationwide. See 42
U.S.C. § 15301 (2006); Arlene Kanter & Rebecca Russo, The Right of People with Disabilities to
Exercise Their Right to Vote Under the Help America Vote Act, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 852, 852 (2006).
173. Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost
Votes, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (2006) (quoting Lyndon Baines Johnson’s comments at the signing
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965) (citation omitted).
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arguments faced by the mentally disabled seeking the right to vote today.
These themes reflect the underlying impetus of many states’ voting laws that
overly restrict mentally disabled individuals from voting and would likely not
pass the strict scrutiny test.
The ABA recently published a Recommendation for modernizing state
laws that restrict the voting rights of the mentally disabled. While the
Recommendation provides a step towards positive reform, additional efforts,
likely from the federal government, will be required to overcome traditional
prejudices and misconceptions about the abilities of the mentally disabled.
Ultimately, “the equal right to vote will be protected only if our nation believes
in it.”174
NICHOLAS F. BRESCIA
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